Market cap plummeted by over 3.3 billion in half a year! Solar PV 'shovel seller' JieJia WeiChuang is down to numbness

The photovoltaic (PV) industry has entered a phase of deep clearing.

Currently, leading PV companies are generally facing deep losses. Recently, LONGi Green Energy and Tongwei Co., Ltd. were the first to disclose their performance forecasts for the first half of 2026. Data shows that LONGi Green Energy is expected to incur a net loss of 3.4 billion to 3.8 billion yuan in the first half of 2026, an expansion in the scale of losses compared to the 2.569 billion yuan loss in the same period last year. Tongwei Co., Ltd. is expected to have a net loss of approximately 4.8 billion to 5.4 billion yuan in the first half of 2026, basically flat with the 4.955 billion yuan loss in the same period last year.

Regarding the worsening performance, LONGi Green Energy stated that the supply and demand dynamics in the PV industry did not show significant improvement during the reporting period, and corporate operations continued to face pressure. Affected by multiple factors such as insufficient new energy consumption capacity and the high base effect from the rush to install projects in the same period last year, the incremental PV installation volume in China saw a significant 阶段性 decline in the first half of the year. The company's module sales and revenue both declined year-on-year, with insufficient production capacity utilization rates and overall gross margins at low levels. Coupled with investment losses from associated enterprises and exchange rate losses triggered by the appreciation of the RMB, the company ultimately incurred operating losses.

Meanwhile, LONGi Green Energy revealed that the company is accelerating its layout in the solar-storage synergy track, launching full-scenario solar-storage integrated products covering large power stations and industrial/commercial parks, continuously building a localized overseas operation system, constantly improving system solution capabilities, and consolidating core competitive advantages.

Tongwei Co., Ltd. analyzed that during the reporting period, the operating rates across all links of the PV industry chain continued to fall, and a batch of backward production capacities with weak competitiveness gradually exited the market. However, the overall pattern of supply-demand imbalance in the industry has not been fundamentally reversed, product prices at all links remain low, corporate operational pressures remain high, and the company's performance continues to be in a loss state.

The deep losses of leading PV companies mean that the industry's "anti-involution" process has entered deep waters, and capacity clearing has entered the most cruel stage. A highly warning signal has already appeared: equipment leading enterprises that previously "sold shovels" in the PV industry have also seen a sharp decline in net profits, and the downward pressure on the industry has been fully transmitted to upstream and downstream sectors.

On July 17, global PV equipment leader Suntech Power (Note: Context implies JieJia WeiChuang/Sungrow equivalent, specifically 'JieJia Weichuang' is often translated as JieJia or kept as proper noun if no standard English name provided, but here we use the Chinese pinyin/name structure or generic description if unknown. However, 'JieJia Weichuang' is a specific company. Let's use 'JieJia Weichuang' or 'Suntech' if it refers to Sungrow? No, JieJia Weichuang is distinct. I will use 'JieJia Weichuang' as per standard practice for unlisted/non-standard names unless specified. Wait, the prompt says 'JieJia Weichuang'. I will translate it as 'JieJia Weichuang'.) disclosed its performance forecast for the first half of 2026. The announcement showed that the company is expected to achieve a net profit of 362 million to 490 million yuan in the first half of the year, a significant year-on-year decline of 73.23% to 80.22%; non-GAAP net profit was 261 million to 389 million yuan, a year-on-year decline of 76.84% to 84.46%.

Explaining the reason for the sharp drop in performance, JieJia Weichuang stated that affected by the phased adjustment in the PV industry, the equipment procurement demand from downstream manufacturers shrank, the number of new orders decreased, and the scale of equipment acceptance and delivery declined, ultimately leading to a significant drop in performance.

More severely, the continuous involution in the industry and the sharp decline in performance directly triggered a deep correction in the company's stock price. Statistical data shows that from February 4, 2026, to date, within just half a year, JieJia Weichuang's stock price fell by more than 60%, wiping out over 33 billion yuan in market value, with the latest closing total market value remaining at only 18.9 billion yuan.

Dangerous Signals

The PV industry has fallen into a collective dilemma. Even equipment enterprises at the upstream of the industry chain, who "sell shovels," cannot remain unaffected. Although there is a certain lag in the performance changes of leading manufacturing enterprises, the pressure of cyclical downturn will eventually affect all enterprises in the industry.

Public information shows that JieJia Weichuang mainly engages in the research, development, production, and sales of solar cell equipment. Its products comprehensively cover mainstream high-efficiency PV cell technology routes such as TOPCon, HJT, XBC, perovskite, and perovskite tandem. It is also laying out semiconductor and lithium battery equipment businesses, among which solar cell equipment is the company's core revenue source.

From the perspective of revenue structure, as of the end of 2025, the company's revenue came entirely from the solar cell production equipment sector. In terms of 细分 product dimensions, 81.85% of revenue came from process equipment, 13.45% from automation supporting equipment, and the remaining 4.71% from equipment accessories and other businesses. In terms of regional structure, domestic revenue accounted for 79.86%, while overseas revenue accounted for 20.14%, indicating that business revenue heavily relies on the domestic market.

In fact, the performance slump of JieJia Weichuang had already completely manifested in the fourth quarter of 2025. Financial report data showed that in Q4 2025, the company's revenue was only 2.366 billion yuan, a significant year-on-year decline of 63.84%; net profit loss was 71.197 million yuan, a year-on-year decline of 109.61%; non-GAAP net profit loss was 103 million yuan, a year-on-year decline of 116.64%.

Entering the first quarter of 2026, the performance slump continued: single-quarter revenue was 1.495 billion yuan, a year-on-year decline of 63.52%; net profit was 270 million yuan, a year-on-year decline of 61.83%.

Notably, as early as the third quarter of 2025, internal shareholders of the company had begun intensive share reductions. On September 4, 2025, JieJia Weichuang announced that its controlling shareholder, actual controller, and their concerted actors Yu Zhong, Hengchuanghuiye, Hongxingyuanye, and Dingjiahuiye cumulatively reduced their shareholdings in the company by 2.534 million shares, 235,300 shares, 55,400 shares, and 89,500 shares respectively between July and early September of that year, cashing out 204 million yuan, 17.403 million yuan, 5.214 million yuan, and 6.433 million yuan respectively, totaling 233 million yuan in cash-outs.

On September 5, 2025, the company issued another reduction announcement. Natural person shareholder Li Shijun planned to reduce holdings by no more than 3 million shares, accounting for 0.8649% of the company's total share capital; executives Jin Jinglei and Tan Xiangping planned to reduce holdings by no more than 5,600 shares and 5,000 shares respectively. Financial reports showed that as of the end of 2025, Li Shijun had cumulatively reduced his holdings by 2.9364 million shares, with the latest shareholding ratio dropping to 1.76%. Information shows that at the time of the company's IPO, Li Shijun held a total of 13.6771 million shares, accounting for 4.27% of the shareholding.

Entering 2026, the pace of share reductions by the company's controlling shareholder, concerted actors, and employee stock ownership plans further accelerated. On February 8, JieJia Weichuang announced that the company's 2022 employee stock ownership plan had completed all reductions, cumulatively selling 1.5132 million shares, accounting for 0.43% of the total share capital. Calculated at the current stock price, the cumulative cash-out was approximately 195 million yuan.

On March 29, the company's controlling shareholder Zuo Guojun, Yu Zhong, and their concerted actors disclosed a inquiry transfer plan, proposing to transfer 11.442 million shares of the company, accounting for 3.29% of the total share capital, at a transfer price of 94.12 yuan/share, with a total transaction amount of approximately 1.077 billion yuan. After this reduction, the overall shareholding ratio of Zuo Guojun, Yu Zhong, Liang Meizhen, and their concerted actors dropped from 32.47% to 21.74%. On April 6, the inquiry transfer shares were fully completed.

While a series of precise reductions landed, JieJia Weichuang's performance continued to deteriorate, and the downward trend had not stopped. Combined with the calculation of the 2026 interim report forecast, even if calculated according to the upper limit of performance, the company's Q2 net profit was about 220 million yuan, and non-GAAP net profit was about 202 million yuan, with the trend of year-on-year performance decline still significant.

The Pain of Cycles

Although the controlling shareholder and concerted actors completed precise reductions before the performance dropped significantly, the market value of their remaining holdings still shrank substantially.

Through equity penetration, it can be seen that currently the company's controlling shareholders Liang Meizhen, Zuo Guojun, and Yu Zhong hold 7.24%, 7.01%, and 5.84% respectively. Calculated at the latest stock price, the market value of their holdings is approximately 1.37 billion yuan, 1.32 billion yuan, and 1.1 billion yuan respectively. Compared to the high point of the stock price in February, the market value of their holdings has shrunk by more than 60%.

The deep correction of the company's stock price is a true reflection of the industry's dilemma and the company's fundamentals.

From the perspective of the overall industry pattern, the PV industry is in a deep adjustment cycle. The interim report forecasts of LONGi Green Energy and Tongwei Co., Ltd. explicitly mentioned that the supply and demand relationship in the industry has not seen substantial improvement, and the contradiction of structural supply-demand imbalance remains prominent. With the pace of capacity expansion across the industry slowing down significantly, the continuous contraction of downstream equipment procurement demand makes the pressure on the performance of PV equipment enterprises like JieJia Weichuang inevitable.

On June 2, at the 19th International Solar Photovoltaic and Smart Energy Conference, Zhu Gongshan, Chairman of GCL Group, publicly stated that the old development model and industry logic of the PV industry have completely failed. The development path of blindly expanding production, low-price involution, and seizing the market with scale has reached its physical limits. The entire industry has fallen into a zero-sum game, ultimately falling into the dilemma of "fighting in the mud, with no winners." How to solve the industry paradox of "the higher the installation volume, the harder the consumption, and the lower the industrial value" is the core issue that all PV practitioners must face.

He also pointed out that the value core of the PV industry is undergoing comprehensive iteration, transforming towards directions that fit new quality productive forces, with technological barriers and system value as the core. The core contradiction of the current industry is no longer simple supply-demand imbalance, but the contradiction between traditional extensive manufacturing models and the demand of new power systems for high-value, adjustable clean energy supply.

At the same time, major institutions have also given judgments on the subsequent trends of the industry. Goldman Sachs' research report pointed out that domestic PV demand is expected to recover in the second half of 2026, and the prosperity of the overseas market will continue to improve. Multiple component enterprises predict that the incremental PV installation volume in China in 2026 is expected to be adjusted up from the initial expectation of 200GW to 220GW-240GW. Goldman Sachs' predicted value is 235GW, corresponding to a year-on-year growth rate of installation volume in the second half of the year exceeding 30%.

Dongxing Securities believes that the PV industry in the first half of 2026 is in a deep adjustment period, with domestic installations declining significantly year-on-year, industry chain prices continuing to operate at low levels, and industry enterprises generally incurring losses. Tail-end inefficient capacity is being cleared at an accelerated pace, and the current industry is in the bottom interval of supply-demand reconstruction. Looking forward to the second half of 2026, three main lines can be focused on: First, supply-side capacity clearing, silicon material and integrated component segments with high start-stop costs will benefit first, and the clearing of main industry chain capacity will also drive the recovery of profitability in auxiliary material segments; Second, the energy storage track, inverter enterprises laying out energy storage PCS and system integration, as well as integrated component enterprises expanding into energy storage businesses, will fully enjoy the dividends of industry growth; Third, frontier PV technologies, such as HJT and perovskite, adapt to extreme space environments and have broad development potential, benefiting related industry chain enterprises.

Guotai Haitong Securities stated that under the support of the long-term logic of continuous top-level energy transition policies and gradually stabilizing industry chain prices, the mid-to-long-term allocation value of PV leaders with integrated capacity and core technology reserves continues to stand out.

On July 2, three mandatory national standards for PV energy consumption and energy efficiency, namely "Limit of Energy Consumption per Unit Product of Monocrystalline Silicon", "Energy Efficiency Limit Values and Energy Efficiency Grades for Crystalline Silicon PV Modules and Inverters", and "Limit of Energy Consumption per Unit Product of Polycrystalline Silicon and Germanium", were officially released. They comprehensively cover core links such as polysilicon, silicon wafers, modules, and inverters. By setting energy consumption and energy efficiency indicators in grades, they strictly control high-energy-consuming and low-efficiency capacity across the entire industry chain. Meanwhile, for module products, a new environmental stress decay rate coupling evaluation index was added.

Industry analysis believes that after the implementation of the new national standards, it is expected to clear about 30% of the backward capacity in the industry, and the elimination of inefficient capacity has become a certainty. However, this data statistical caliber includes a large amount of planned capacity that has not yet been put into production, and the actual elimination proportion of in-production capacity remains to be observed.

Kan Jian Finance believes that the current PV industry is in a deep clearing cycle, with leading enterprises continuing to incur losses and small and medium tail-end capacity being cleared at an accelerated pace. Industry pain is unavoidable. As backward capacity is gradually cleared, the market share of leading PV enterprises will further increase, and the 无序 involution competition pattern of the industry will be effectively improved. After this round of capacity clearing is completed, the PV industry will thoroughly bid farewell to extensive development and enter a new stage of high-quality development.