AITO vs. Li Auto: Clash of the EV Leaders – Who Holds the Edge?

Aito is recognized as the number one rival by Li Auto, including in the statements of its founder, Li Xiang, who has mentioned that Huawei's organizational strength is too strong. The M7 released in the third quarter of 2022 directly crippled the Li ONE, and $Li Auto(LI.US) later counterattacked with strong organizational adjustments and combat capabilities.

To this day, the two have been fiercely competing in the mid-to-high-end extended-range SUV battlefield for three years, but it is still difficult to determine a winner. Currently, both have firmly established themselves in the mid-to-high-end SUV niche, remaining the "two giants" in the mid-to-high-end SUV new energy vehicle track.

Therefore, Dolphin Research's report will focus on several core issues that investors are most concerned about:

1. First mover vs. follower, why can Seres still successfully break through?

2. What are the advantages and disadvantages of Li Auto's product definition leading model?

3. Compared to Li Auto, how valuable is the Aito model?

4. How to view the current investment value of Li Auto and Seres?

This article focuses on answering the first two questions, as follows:

1. The game between first movers and followers, why can Seres still successfully break through?

1) Li Auto's first-mover advantage: precise positioning

a. Strong ability to explore blue ocean tracks: SUVs priced above 300,000 yuan are rapidly rising

From the demand changes in the market above 300,000 yuan, SUVs are rapidly rising, occupying nearly half of the market. In 2023, SUVs accounted for 52% of the total passenger car sales above 300,000 yuan (sedans only accounted for 35%).

Compared to sedans, SUVs have disadvantages in overall handling and urban commuting economy, but due to their large space and the basic configuration of four-wheel drive systems, they better meet the needs of family cars (especially multi-child families) and all-scenario usage. The consumer group for models above 300,000 yuan is indeed dominated by family cars (high-income middle-class families as the main force), and the demand for replacement and upgrade purchases occupies an absolute dominant position (married families with children account for over 90% of replacement and upgrade users).

Looking at Li Auto's brand positioning, Dolphin Research found that from its establishment, Li Auto's brand positioning was very clear. Li Auto has always positioned itself as a "mobile home," successfully catering to the trend of continuous expansion in the SUV market above 300,000 yuan, with family use as the dominant trend, through comfort configurations such as "refrigerator, color TV, and large sofa."

b. Breaking through the technical route: simple and practical extended-range route

New energy brands' SUVs priced above 300,000 yuan, to meet high-end users' needs for space and all-scenario usage, are basically medium to large full-size SUVs equipped with dual-motor four-wheel drive modes, but vehicle weight and multiple motors directly affect range capability.

① Impact of vehicle weight: Generally, for every 10% increase in vehicle weight, battery capacity needs to be increased by 8%-12% to achieve the same range level. The curb weight of full-size SUVs is inherently high, and the configuration of dual-motor four-wheel drive further increases curb weight, leading to the natural "bug" of range capability for full-size pure electric models.

② High energy consumption of dual-motor models: The peak power of dual-motor four-wheel drive models is usually twice that of single-motor models, and efficiency decreases when the motor outputs high power (especially when exceeding rated power), leading to a sharp increase in energy consumption.

This also results in high-end pure electric SUVs priced above 300,000 yuan, especially pure electric medium and large full-size SUVs, even if the battery configuration is pushed to the highest within controllable cost range, even if equipped with a 100kWh ternary lithium battery, even after several iterations of the battery, the overall pure electric range can only reach 600-700km, lower than the range of pure electric SUVs priced between 200,000-300,000 yuan (600-800km).

③ Users above 300,000 yuan have higher demands for all-scenario car usage:

Users above 300,000 yuan have fundamentally different needs from users in the just-needed price range: users in the just-needed price range focus more on urban car usage as the main car scenario (paying more attention to economy), while users above 300,000 yuan have higher demands for all-scenario car usage, especially for long-distance car usage scenarios such as highways.

CLTC range is based on normal temperature laboratory environment and mainly focuses on urban low-speed low-power consumption conditions, so actual real range, especially in winter highway conditions (with air conditioning on), real range of NCM batteries around 70% is very common, and actual range may only be around 400-500km, making it difficult to support the all-scenario car usage needs of users above 300,000 yuan.

Ultimately, the root of this contradiction still lies in the limitations of battery materials. Even the NCM battery with the highest energy density is still constrained by chemical characteristics, and the improvement in energy density has basically reached the ceiling, leading to the "range-cost" dual-target imbalance of large SUVs. The real solution to the range bug may still rely on the next-generation technology route of batteries (solid-state batteries/semi-solid-state batteries).

From the current results, the market above 300,000 yuan is still continuously increasing penetration with plug-in hybrids (including extended-range), while the penetration rate of pure electric is even showing a downward trend.

From the direct performance of car companies, Nio's main brand pure electric sales continue to be sluggish, and pure electric car companies originally priced at 300,000+ (ZEEKR, XPeng, Avatr, etc.) have all lowered their model prices to the 200,000-level price range, which actually reflects the insufficient demand for high-end pure electric, forcing car companies to lower prices when they can't sell.Currently, it seems that plug-in hybrids (including extended-range) are still the optimal solution above 300,000 yuan.

Of course, Li Auto was also the first in this track to adopt the extended-range technology that was not favored by the industry at the time, but in fact, compared to plug-in hybrids, extended-range can more closely approach the driving experience of pure electric cars (extended-range is driven by electricity, without the "oil-electric switching jerking" problem of plug-in hybrids).

Thus, Li Auto's success stems from the precise capture of market demand:

a. Blue ocean track: Grasping the trend of continuous expansion in the family SUV market above 300,000 yuan, brand positioning tightly revolves around "mobile home," directly targeting the mindset of family users.

b. Excellent product definition ability: Directly targeting the needs of high-end users above 300,000 yuan for all-scenario car usage, choosing the extended-range route that was not favored by everyone at the time as a transitional solution, while tightly revolving around the needs of family SUVs, fully equipping comfort configurations such as "refrigerator, color TV, and large sofa" (PS: Li Auto was also the first car company among new forces to equip air suspension on its models, while air suspension was exclusive to luxury cars like BBA at the time).

Result: The first model launched by Li Auto, Li ONE, focused on core features: extended-range + large six-seater + SUV, and equipped with the "refrigerator, color TV, and large sofa" that users are familiar with, successfully creating a benchmark for family SUVs.

The reason behind this is also the excellent product definition (high product power) that fully meets the fundamental needs of the blue ocean track for family SUVs above 300,000 yuan, and the brand power formed on this basis, continuing to expand its product matrix (L6/L7/L8/L9), firmly guarding the family SUV market.

Of course, this is also inseparable from the founder Li Xiang's background in the internet, with multiple successful entrepreneurial experiences, extremely adept at digging into user pain points, and therefore, in Li Auto's subsequent strategic choices, it has consistently wanted to be the "first mover" in the blue ocean track (including the pure electric MPV Mega, and the upcoming large pure electric SUV Li i8, but this strategy itself carries higher risks).

2) Seres: Achieving corner overtaking through deep cooperation with Huawei

From the model development paths of Li Auto and Seres, after Li Auto's first model Li ONE was successfully delivered at the end of 2019, Huawei entered this blue ocean track (mid-to-high-end extended-range SUV) in a following manner, but as a cross-border player in the mobile phone industry, it chose a path completely different from Xiaomi—empowering Seres with the "Smart Selection Car" model, rather than directly entering the car manufacturing field.

The success of Seres is essentially achieved through deep cooperation with Huawei:

a. Breaking through with Smart Selection Car:

Seres is the first partner under Huawei's Smart Selection model (signed in January 2019), Dolphin Research believes it is mainly based on three considerations:

① Manufacturing foundation: Seres obtained new energy vehicle manufacturing qualifications in 2017, and through two entrepreneurial accumulations, it has traditional upstream component R&D capabilities and complete vehicle manufacturing experience;

② Complementary capabilities: However, Seres is still from a traditional component and car company background, compared to new forces like Li Auto with highly internet thinking, Seres has shortcomings in areas such as intelligence, user operation, and product definition with internet genes;

③ Cooperation efficiency: As a weaker party in the industry, Seres can actively cede control, more easily accepting Huawei's dominance in R&D, channels, and marketing, reducing the struggle for autonomy, and making cooperation more efficient;

For Huawei, this model also allows Huawei to quickly achieve:

① Quickly verify and improve the Smart Selection Car model: By leading product design, intelligent empowerment (HarmonyOS), and channel integration (Huawei store sales), Huawei can efficiently verify and improve the Smart Selection Car model in the short term.

② Use the Aito series as a sample to promote the expansion of the Smart Selection model to more car companies: Due to the success of the Aito models, Huawei's HarmonyOS Smart Mobility model (formerly Smart Selection Car model) successfully expanded to "Huawei Five Realms."

b. Deepening adjustments in cooperation mode:

After establishing the cooperation relationship, Huawei and Seres began jointly developing the extended-range platform (mainly funded by Seres), started to take charge of Seres' product design and definition, and successively delivered the Aito M5 and M7 models in January 2022 and July 2022, directly targeting Li ONE, as "Quick followers."

These two models indeed had a huge impact on Li ONE immediately after their launch, including in the statements of its founder, Li Xiang, who mentioned that Huawei's organizational strength is too strong, and the launch and operation of the M7 in July 2022 directly crippled Li ONE, causing Li Auto's stock price to quickly drop from a high of $41 in June 2022 to a low of less than $14 in November 2022.

However, during Li Auto's low point, Li Auto quickly launched the L9/L8/L7 models to counterattack (the delivery time between the three models was only about half a year, and the price range was from high to low), further improving the product matrix, completely covering the car usage needs of family users above 300,000 yuan, successfully saving Li Auto's crisis moment, and directly causing Aito's sales momentum to quickly decline after briefly reaching monthly sales of over 10,000 units.

Looking back, Dolphin Research found that the main reasons why the two old models M5 and M7 in 2022 could not sustainably shake the basic market of Li Auto's L series extended-range were:

1. Problems in the initial stage of the Smart Selection Car cooperation model (2022 and before)

In 2022, Huawei's cooperation with Seres was an initial exploration of the Smart Selection Car model, still in the stage of adjustment and adaptation:

① Huawei did not fully lead product definition: Therefore, in terms of the most critical product power of the models, Huawei did not intervene in the chassis design of Aito, so unlike Li Auto's vehicle architecture designed for pure electric drive, the chassis and body architecture of the old models M5 and M7 were still based on the transformation of traditional fuel vehicle platforms (such as Dongfeng Fengguang ix7), belonging to models with a high proportion of "oil-to-electricity" transformation, which naturally made the product power of the old models M5 and M7 inferior to Li Auto.

M5 product definition problem: M5 is defined as a compact extended-range SUV, and its space and comfort are difficult to meet the core needs of family users.

Insufficient product power of the old Aito M7: Whether in terms of space and comfort, energy management and overall range, or chassis and suspension, the product power of the old Aito M7 is significantly inferior to Li Auto's L7, especially the first-generation Aito M5 and Aito M7 are oil-to-electricity products.

② Huawei's control over Seres' production was insufficient: In terms of production, since Seres was mainly responsible for complete vehicle manufacturing, and Huawei did not directly control the production line, there were delivery delays due to supply chain issues at the initial stage of M7's launch in 2022, and there were also some manufacturing process defects (chassis noise, soft suspension causing body sway during high-speed cornering, etc.), resulting in a very short cycle of model popularity.

③ Ambiguous brand positioning and perception of Aito: At the same time, in terms of brand building and marketing, Huawei and Aito's cooperation in 2022 was still mainly based on Huawei's technical endorsement (without clearly defining the HUAWEI Aito brand identity), and in terms of channels, it was mainly used for display and traffic attraction (experience centers) in Huawei stores, while Seres led production and delivery, consumers were confused about the brand positioning and perception of Aito.

c) Adjustments in the Smart Selection model cooperation, further deepening cooperation (2023 and beyond)

① Huawei directly responsible for new product definition: Huawei fully leads smart driving, chassis optimization, product renewal, and pricing strategy;

② Direct empowerment of Huawei brand: Clearly define the Huawei Aito brand identity, directly empower Aito with Huawei's brand power, avoiding consumer confusion about Aito's brand perception;

③ Comprehensive upgrade of channels and marketing: In July 2023, Seres and Huawei jointly decided to establish the "AITO Aito Sales and Service Joint Working Group," fully responsible for end-to-end closed-loop management of marketing, sales, delivery, service, and channels.

This deepening adjustment in cooperation was also directly effective, with the key turning point for Seres being the revamped Aito M7 released in September 2023:

① Product definition and product power: comprehensive upgrades in chassis, range, smart driving, and space comfort;

② Marketing strategy: clearly define the Huawei Aito brand identity + Huawei fully responsible for Aito brand marketing, while the hot sales of Huawei Mate 60 also attracted traffic for the new M7;

③ M7 pricing: compared to the 2022 model, the price was reduced by 40,000-50,000 yuan, and the revamped model was a big hit upon launch, with cumulative orders exceeding 60,000 units in the first month of launch.

In January 2024, Aito M7 sales climbed to a peak of 30,000 units, surpassing Li Auto's sales, and in February 2024, taking advantage of the strong sales momentum, Aito launched the highest-priced product in its product matrix, Aito M9, which became Aito's best-selling product at its peak, achieving monthly sales of 17,000 units, directly topping the sales chart of SUVs priced above 400,000 yuan.

Seres also successfully established itself in the mid-to-high-end SUV niche with the M7+M9 models (especially the M9).

2. Li Auto vs. Seres: Advantages and disadvantages of Li Auto's product definition model

Although Li Auto and Seres have chosen the same track, the essence of their success is not the same—Li Auto builds barriers with "blue ocean track exploration + excellent product definition," while Seres achieves corner overtaking with "Huawei empowerment";

① Li Auto: Blue ocean track exploration + product definition leading model

Relying on founder Li Xiang's ability to dig into user pain points (such as the family car usage scenario of high-end SUVs), and using excellent product definition capabilities to meet the user needs of this blue ocean track, including Li Auto's subsequent strategic choices, it has consistently wanted to be the "first mover" in emerging blue ocean tracks.

The advantages of this strategic model are:

a. Enjoying the first-mover dividend: continuously standing firm in the mid-to-high-end SUV niche, building brand power with product power

Li Auto firmly captures the mindset of family users with the explosive model Li ONE, establishing the user perception anchor of buying Li Auto = the most suitable mid-to-high-end family SUV, emphasizing space and practicality, and building brand power on the basis of high product power.

Therefore, the user mindset established by Li Auto allows it to continuously stand firm in the mid-to-high-end SUV niche, and with the Li ONE+L9/8/7 product matrix, Li Auto's market share of plug-in hybrid models priced above 300,000 yuan has consistently occupied more than half of the market share for four consecutive years from 2020 to 2023 (market share peaked at 65% in 2021, and for four consecutive years, the market share of models priced above 300,000 yuan exceeded 50%), until 2024 when the market share of models priced above 300,000 yuan was taken by Aito M9.

Therefore, it can be seen that Li Auto not only enjoys the industry beta dividend brought by the continuous market share increase of plug-in hybrids priced above 300,000 yuan, but also builds its own alpha with the first-mover advantage, and the dividend period of high sales and revenue growth for Li Auto lasted for nearly 4-5 years, making it the new force with the highest sales and revenue growth rate and the highest market value among the "three strong" competition of Nio, XPeng, and Li Auto.

b. The "doll model" of the L series saves both R&D expenses and manufacturing costs, enjoying higher-than-industry gross margin and profit margin advantages:

Although due to the decline in battery costs and the gradual increase in competition among new energy car companies, the ASP of car sales for Nio, XPeng, and Li Auto has been on a downward trajectory since 2022, Li Auto's car sales gross margin is the most stable, basically maintaining around 20%, making it the car company with the highest car sales gross margin among Nio, XPeng, and Li Auto. While Nio's car sales unit price was higher than Li Auto's in 2024, its car sales gross margin fell to only 12%.

Therefore, Li Auto's car sales gross margin above the industry average is partly due to the premium brought by the first-mover dividend and the scale effect advantage of standing firm in the mid-to-high-end SUV track, and partly due to the cost savings of the "doll model" (after Li ONE, the subsequent L9/8/7/6 series launched by Li Auto are essentially "doll models" of Li ONE, with high platform and component commonality, which can save manufacturing and procurement costs to a certain extent).

From the perspective of car companies' R&D expenses, when Li Auto's revenue scale was 2.2 times that of Nio in 2024, its R&D expenses were 2 billion yuan lower than Nio's in 2024, and its R&D expense rate was continuously at a low level in the industry due to the advantage release of the sales leverage effect brought by the mid-to-high-end extended-range dividend.

This relatively low R&D expense is partly because Li Auto's R&D efficiency is much higher than Nio's, and partly because the "doll models" of extended-range do not require too much R&D expense investment, therefore, Li Auto can invest more R&D expenses in building the next moat (such as Li Auto's attempt in the high-end pure electric blue ocean track and the investment in smart driving that can affect the car company's endgame).

This also makes Li Auto the first new force to achieve profitability, accumulating relatively sufficient cash flow by leveraging the first-mover dividend advantage in the mid-to-high-end extended-range SUV, so from Li Auto's own operational perspective, even if the pure electric model under the blue ocean strategy fails to meet expectations again, there is still enough cash cushion on hand to try and make strategic adjustments.

c. Leading investment and progress in smart driving can enjoy the potential dual release of profit and valuation when the next smart driving inflection point arrives:

In Dolphin Research's previous article "Ultimate Questioning, Can FSD Really Support Tesla's $1.5 Trillion?", the significance of smart driving for car companies has been discussed in detail.

Currently, the new energy vehicle industry is already in serious overcapacity and internal competition, especially as electrification innovation is nearing its end, relying solely on car sales as hardware revenue, even if car companies can dig out segmented blue ocean tracks, the advantage of the dividend period is getting shorter and shorter (it may be caught up in less than a year), and the key to building a moat for car companies and boosting valuation (from hardware valuation to soft-hard integration valuation) is also an important competitive factor in the endgame mode of car sales.

Therefore, car companies are all increasing investment in intelligence under Tesla's leadership, and in December 2024, Li Auto also announced its transformation from "smart electric vehicle company" to "artificial intelligence company." Currently, Li Auto's smart driving capability is also in the industry's first echelon, and when the smart driving inflection point arrives, Li Auto may be able to enjoy the potential dual release of profit and valuation. (But the smart driving inflection point has not yet arrived, and the valuation of domestic car companies is still tightly revolving around car sales volume)

But the disadvantages of this strategy are:

① The moat of extended-range technology itself is not high, leading to the continuous erosion of the first-mover advantage dividend of Li Auto's L series:

From the market share of Li Auto's extended-range models priced above 300,000 yuan (Li Auto's extended-range model sales above 300,000 yuan/total sales of plug-in hybrid models priced above 300,000 yuan), the first-mover advantage in the mid-to-high-end extended-range indeed gave Li Auto a leading period of nearly 4-5 years. Li Auto's market share of plug-in hybrid models priced above 300,000 yuan has consistently occupied more than half of the market share.

But after 2024, it faced a strong impact from the competitor Aito M9, and the market share began to decline, and in 2025, the impact on Li Auto's extended-range basic market was even greater, with the first-mover dividend advantage of mid-to-high-end extended-range SUVs continuously being eroded, and Li Auto's market share of models priced above 300,000 yuan has dropped from more than half to only 27.5% in January-May 2025.

Specifically, the impact on Li Auto's extended-range basic market after 2024 can be seen:

Li Auto's market share of models priced above 300,000 yuan has fluctuated between 30%-40% since the launch of Aito M9 in February 2024, but overall it is showing a downward trend, especially in 2025, directly competing with Aito, using the revamped M9+new M8 product matrix to continuously attack Li Auto's combination of L7+L8+L9, Li Auto's market share above 300,000 yuan has declined more significantly, dropping to only 23% by May 2025.

When Li Auto's L7/8/9 series basic market was impacted by Aito's competition in March 2024, and Mega also failed, Li Auto quickly launched the lowest-priced L6 in its model structure to save sales, leveraging its brand power built through product power to make model downward adjustments.

Generally, car companies' brand downgrades come with brand momentum advantages, and it is easier to hit the price range from top to bottom, so after the launch of Li Auto's L6, it indeed saved Li Auto's sales, contributing nearly 200,000 units to Li Auto's actual sales of 500,000 units in 2024, and in the second quarter of 2024 and beyond, it also accounted for nearly half of Li Auto's model structure.

But in January-May 2025, the market share of Li Auto's L6 also began to decline, the market share of models priced above 200,000 yuan also dropped to only 25% at the low point in May 2025.

The fundamental reason behind the decline in market share is still the continuous consumption of the first-mover advantage dividend of Li Auto's L series, especially since Li Auto itself is not truly a player born from brand power (the model structure is continuously sinking), and if the user group values practicality attributes (large space + family attributes), it is naturally easy to be attracted by competitive models with lower prices but also good product power, especially when the moat of extended-range technology itself is not high and relatively easy to imitate.

In 2025, in addition to direct competition with Aito, the number of players entering the mid-to-high-end extended-range/plug-in hybrid SUV market is increasing, and the competition faced by Li Auto's extended-range basic market is also continuously increasing:

a. First pain point—product premium: achieving larger space with lower prices, positioning as a six-seater large SUV directly attacking Li Auto and Aito:

Players who themselves target mid-to-high-end brands, so pricing is still in the price range above 300,000 yuan: such as Denza N9, Lynk & Co 900, currently these two models have a combined market share of nearly 10% for two consecutive months, able to grab market share from Li Auto and Aito; and there are also ZEEKR electric hybrid models launching in the second half of the year;

Players who themselves target cost-effective routes, so pricing is in the price range of 200,000-300,000 yuan: Deep Blue S09, Galaxy M9, also known as "half-price Li Auto";

b. Second pain point, using "large battery" + "small fuel tank" solution to attack the extended-range market: mainly XPeng in the second half of this year, and Xiaomi in 2026;

This year, Li Auto's extended-range revamped models have all been launched (the revamp intensity is relatively small), but in the second half of the year, Aito still has the revamped M7 launching, and the revamp intensity of Li Auto's extended-range basic market models is getting smaller and smaller (especially the small revamp of the L series in 2025, basically only upgrading smart driving and lidar).

At the same time, Li Auto's second pain point for extended-range models: the pure electric range for the most frequent car usage scenario—urban commuting has almost no upgrade, and currently, it seems that such upgrade intensity cannot effectively defend the extended-range basic market.

② High-risk exposure brought by misjudging the blue ocean track:

Li Auto's blue ocean track exploration + product definition leading model, this strategic model is inherently accompanied by high-risk exposure, and once the track is misjudged, it will trigger a double kill of profit and valuation.

And Li Auto's first pure electric strategy model: Li Auto Mega is a typical case, essentially a misjudgment of the market space for pure electric MPVs under the blue ocean track strategy + pricing error of its own model:

1) Track misjudgment + product positioning error

Blue ocean track misjudgment: Pure electric MPVs priced above 300,000 yuan are still a niche market, with monthly sales long-term only around 4,000 units before Mega's launch.

Scenario disconnection: The car usage attribute of MPVs is more suitable for business reception, but Mega still follows the logic of Li Auto's family attributes, but family MPVs need to meet all-scenario car usage needs, especially long-distance travel.

Li Auto's Mega priced at 559,800 yuan, although the CLTC pure electric range is 710km (actual highway range is 400km-500km), at the time of Mega's first launch, Li Auto's self-built supercharging stations were only over 300, and the energy replenishment facilities were very incomplete, making it difficult to meet the practicality and all-scenario car usage needs of family users.

2) Pricing detached from brand premium capability:

Brand premium cannot support the high pricing of 559,800 yuan: Li Auto overestimated the brand premium brought by its family attributes, Li Auto's brand power is essentially built on the basis of high product power (Li Auto's target group is also family and practicalists), and if only competing on brand power, it is not as good as players with inherent brand power like Huawei (Li Auto's model structure sinking trend vs. Aito's model structure upward trend).

Mega's initial launch pricing of 559,800 yuan was too high, and Li Auto's brand premium could not support this pricing.

Insufficient product power: Compared to Li Auto's flagship model L9, Mega's internal design upgrades are limited, and the product power did not match the premium expectations.

The failure of Mega led to two chain reactions:

a. Profit flash crash: In Li Auto's first-quarter earnings report for 2024, it also reflected the failure of Mega, including the inability to adjust the pace of investment in three expenses (advancing according to the expected sales of 650,000-800,000 units), and the strategic focus being overly placed on the Mega model, leading to a series of negative chain reactions such as forced price reductions due to the chaotic operating pace of the L series, as detailed in Dolphin Research's earnings report commentary: "Li Auto: Profit Flash Crash! The Moment of Testing Faith Has Arrived".

b. Stock price collapse: From the historical stock price review of Li Auto, in addition to the impact of competition from Aito + the slowing penetration speed of the market above 300,000 yuan (eating into BBA's market), which impacted Li Auto's extended-range sales basic market (the growth rate of extended-range model sales slowed in 2024), Li Auto's Mega model as the flagship model of the pure electric strategy, its first battle failure caused Li Auto's stock price to drop from a high of nearly $46 at the end of February 2024 to a stage low of around $18 in less than four months.

Therefore, it can be seen that Li Auto's blue ocean track strategy is essentially a high-risk high-reward investment model, and once successful, it will bring a double hit to profit and valuation (the Davis double hit brought by the successful positioning of the L series extended-range models), but once failed, it will trigger the Davis double kill moment.

Dolphin Research will continue to take you through the next article:

1. Compared to Li Auto, how valuable is the Aito model?

2. Behind these two model battles, is it the product definition model leading the value victory, or Huawei's high brand power stickiness supporting Aito's crowning? Whose investment is more valuable at the current point in time?

Stay tuned!