The "Takeout" War Revelation: Expectation Gap and Anti-Consensus

In July, the heat is on, but even hotter is the new Three Kingdoms battle in the takeaway industry.

Several years ago, the Chinese takeaway market saw a fierce competition among three companies represented by Meituan, Ele.me, and Baidu Waimai, ultimately resulting in the exit of the red player through a fire sale.

Back then, takeaway was merely about food delivery; today, we are discussing takeaway that also includes flash purchases of various goods. Unless specifically noted, takeaway in this article refers to the broad definition of instant retail—covering both food delivery and non-food flash purchases, which is why we have put quotation marks around takeaway in the title.

In 2025, JD.com, along with its red army, made a strong comeback, breaking through 25 million orders on June 1, marking a significant resurgence.

Ele.me's parent company Alibaba also went all out, not only leveraging core resources from Taobao and Alipay's homepage but also announcing a 50 billion yuan subsidy plan on July 2. Taobao's flash purchase (including Ele.me) surpassed 40 million orders by the end of May, 60 million by the end of June, and 80 million by July 5, gaining significant momentum.

In contrast to the aggressive new platforms, Meituan has remained quite restrained, refraining from crazy subsidies for high-elasticity categories like tea and coffee, and not issuing a large number of coupons. Nevertheless, its order volume continued to exceed 90 million orders after mid-June, especially maintaining a market share of around 70% for meal orders.

The summer season is traditionally a peak period for takeaway, and with competitors continuously ramping up their efforts, Meituan also made a small move on July 5. Without large-scale promotion, it quietly issued more substantial coupons to consumers. By around 6 PM that day, the Meituan app was overwhelmed in some regions, leading to automatic traffic restrictions. Meanwhile, at 8:45 PM that day, the order volume surpassed 100 million, and by 10:54 PM, it exceeded 120 million.

Somewhat regrettably, in this July battle, JD.com's takeaway gradually fell silent, and market attention shifted back to Meituan and Alibaba.

This is not surprising; during the previous two months when JD.com's takeaway was soaring, we had predicted:

The second quarter is JD's best quarter for free cash flow each year, and with 618 being its home turf, there is significant motivation to finish strong this quarter. The third quarter is typically a slow season for e-commerce and a peak season for takeaway, which means it needs to invest more bullets in a quarter with the least ammunition. Therefore, the third quarter is likely to be a hurdle, and JD.com may find itself in a dilemma; we should continue to observe.

Today, we will continue to provide some observations that differ from market consensus for your reference, with the core viewpoints as follows:

The value of order rushing is significant tactically, but not strategically;

There are many uncertainties in the order rushing strategy;

Instant retail ultimately is a street battle rather than an aerial battle;

Predictions against consensus regarding the competitive endgame.

1. What is the value of order rushing?

Overall, order rushing holds more tactical value for Meituan rather than strategic necessity, as both food delivery and flash purchases are essentially local businesses with limited supply and steady demand, which is fundamentally different from shelf e-commerce that operates on unlimited supply + serving the entire nation from one location E-commerce can concentrate a month's demand into a single day, but meals must be eaten daily; it's impossible to eat a month's worth in one day, as neither supply nor demand can achieve that.

The food delivery industry has already entered a relatively mature stage, with Meituan firmly established as a stable industry leader, clearly having no need to lead the charge for daily orders.

Of course, there are exceptions, such as Meituan's annual tradition of launching a milk tea order surge on the day of the beginning of autumn. Last year's "First Cup of Milk Tea in Autumn" event on August 7 saw Meituan's instant retail order volume exceed 90 million, while this year's peak order volume occurred 33 days earlier.

This kind of sporadic order surge can, to some extent, raise the industry's ceiling. In this peak order period, Meituan's food delivery orders surpassed 100 million, and non-food instant retail orders also exceeded 20 million, indicating that the entire market still has significant potential. At the same time, it can test the stability of merchants' supply and fulfillment resources. In absolute terms, these numbers are certainly not comparable to the e-commerce order volume myths of 618 or Double 11, but considering the supply constraints of food delivery and the short-term high concurrency, Meituan's delivery network system elasticity has indeed withstood the test.

For Meituan, the value of order surges is more tactical: occasionally flexing its muscles to strengthen merchant and market confidence, letting everyone know that "it's not that it can't be done, but that it isn't being done."

Especially considering that Meituan achieved this without large-scale prior promotion and with virtually no abnormalities in merchant supply, rider fulfillment, or consumer experience, compared to competitors who occasionally face order delays, overtime, location issues, and backend instability, this further validates the deep user mindset, merchant supply, and fulfillment delivery moat that Meituan has established in the food delivery sector.

For competing firms, order surges carry too many strategic expectations:

Taking JD.com as an example, it likely hopes to achieve multiple goals through order surges in categories like milk tea and coffee, which have high elasticity in both supply and demand.

The first goal is to penetrate from tea and coffee into main meal categories; the second goal is to penetrate from food delivery into non-food instant retail; the third goal is to leverage overall instant retail to support e-commerce, achieving better cross-selling synergy.

These are not secrets; we have heard many such voices in public forums.

However, these expectations carry uncertainties at every stage, and the ultimate effectiveness remains a question mark.

II. Uncertainty of Strategic Expectations

First, tea and coffee are special categories in food delivery because they have strong brand regional chain penetration, high profit margins, intense market competition, oversupply, high demand elasticity, all-day availability, standardized supply, and relatively simple production, meeting all the conditions for order surge promotions Therefore, the new platform's choice of tea and coffee as an entry point to boost orders is indeed a very smart choice.

However, dining consumption does not meet these conditions in most aspects. The time is highly concentrated within two hours for lunch and dinner, consumer demand is generally stable, and merchants have limited supply in a short period.

It is evident that takeout for dining is much more complex in terms of operational difficulty and is also hard to convert through order boosting. Instead, the experience issues encountered during the tea and coffee order boosting process may alert consumers to be more cautious in choosing dining takeout platforms.

Considering that both merchants and delivery riders have profit motives, they naturally invest more time and resources into leading platforms rather than immature new entrants. It is very reasonable that every rational person in commercial activities acts in their self-interest.

Without aggressive subsidies, Meituan's market share in food delivery has remained stable at around 70%, which also validates that the effectiveness of penetrating dining consumption through tea and coffee order boosting is questionable.

Now, let's talk about the second layer. Non-food instant retail is still in the early market stage, and supply is still insufficient, especially in non-core urban areas and the overall sinking market. Meituan has significantly enriched the supply side through its self-operated Xiaoxiang front warehouses and over 30,000 affiliated lightning warehouses, and the fulfillment resources are the most abundant, barely meeting basic demand, but still need improvement.

For platforms where supply and fulfillment infrastructure are not well-developed, attempting to boost instant retail order volume through order boosting subsidies cannot be said to be meaningless, but it may be quite limited.

As for the third layer, both takeout and instant retail are perceived by users as 30-minute delivery, while e-commerce is perceived as N-day delivery. When a user's mindset for 30-minute pickup is stronger, their acceptance of N-day delivery may be lower, which is understandable. In other words, a person is generally more willing to shift from N-day delivery to 30-minute delivery rather than the opposite. It is easier to transition from frugality to luxury than from luxury to frugality; this is human nature.

Therefore, in the long run, attempting to achieve enhanced cross-selling between takeout users and e-commerce is also questionable.

Moreover, among the users boosting orders for milk tea and coffee, there are many who are opportunistic or low-value users. Subsidizing such users and then trying to earn e-commerce profits from them also raises a question mark.

Now, to retain the new users we attract through tea and coffee impulse activities and achieve effective cross-coordinated sales, we first need to assume that they shift from tea and coffee consumption to dining takeout, then assume they shift from dining consumption to instant retail, and simultaneously assume they also shift to shelf e-commerce, while also assuming they are users of normal value.

If a prediction requires satisfying one assumption, we can take it as true; if it requires two, we can only listen; if it requires three or more, regardless of the final result, we may have to assume it cannot be realized All in all, the overall strategy of order rushing is still to subsidize demand, attempting to leverage the entire network through order volume. Its vulnerability lies in the neglect of the fact that the takeaway business is a network woven together by users, fulfillment, and supply. What truly determines your upper limit is, in fact, your lower limit.

III. Takeaway is Ultimately Urban Warfare, Not Air Warfare

Just a few days ago, I ordered a takeaway at home. About 5 minutes after placing the order, I ordered a cup of milk tea, coincidentally from a shop in the same business district as the takeaway vendor. Approximately 25 minutes later, I received both orders delivered by the same delivery person. I was quite surprised at the time, but later thought that this kind of experience might become somewhat of a norm in the future. Such short-time orders from the same user in the same business district used to be difficult for the system to achieve "group ordering," but with the popularization of AI large models, it may no longer be out of reach. It's not just the evolution of algorithms; the evolution of the business itself will also enhance this experience. For example, "Pin Hao Fan" actually has this logic embedded in it. The system prioritizes facilitating group orders for users who are close together and on the same route, arranging for a rider to deliver multiple orders in one trip, which can reduce delivery costs and, in turn, lower the dining costs for users. The recently launched "Raccoon Canteen" further materializes the intensive supply chain by aggregating through offline takeaway stores, enhancing food safety standards and consumer cross-store consumption experiences while reducing costs. User subsidies are certainly important; for instance, "Shen Qiang Shou" and "Member Expansion Coupons" directly subsidize users. However, this more precise user subsidy targets effective demand, which can elevate the average order value while enhancing user loyalty and retention rates. In the long run, the efficiency of subsidies will be higher. In addition to innovations in supply chain and user operations, Meituan Takeaway is also working on must-order lists, dine-in store tags, local specialty foods, and store exploration notes, helping consumers discover more and better food maps, providing summer heat subsidies for riders, and simplifying the backend operation systems for merchants and partners. Local life is a slow business, and takeaway is even more so. Many people are obsessed with simple and crude subsidy air warfare, perhaps eager to occupy a strategic high ground for a quick victory. Historically, this somewhat contradicts the development laws of the industry. Water battles like tea and coffee have certain air warfare attributes; on one hand, it is the uniqueness of these categories, and on the other hand, new platforms have their "cash capabilities." However, takeaway is ultimately a protracted tug-of-war, and it cannot be accomplished in one battle.

It does not follow the general logic of e-commerce business where GMV = traffic * average order value * conversion rate. Even in the tea and coffee category, merchant supply has physical space and time limits, let alone in the main meal category. Moreover, the scale of the fulfillment network further restricts the long-term value of air warfare.

Whether it's a hundred billion subsidy or a subsidy exceeding a hundred billion, they can achieve impressive results in a short time, but in the long run, it still needs to return to urban and even business district operations based on user geographic positioning:

Within an extremely limited spatial range, merchants need to recruit and operate one by one; rider capacity needs to be gradually built; and consumer experience also needs to gradually improve.

Only when users, fulfillment, and supply achieve balance can the entire consumption experience reach an optimal state. Unilateral subsidies to users may be effective in the short term, but the long-term effects need to be questioned significantly

A few months ago, JD.com was in the spotlight, but it quickly fell into silence, likely confirming the logic mentioned above.

What’s more concerning is that the core factor determining whether food delivery can be profitable lies in the scale and density of orders within a limited space, as this will directly relate to fulfillment costs. The higher the order density, the more orders a rider can deliver at once. Assuming the average order price is 6 yuan, delivering 3 orders at a time earns 18 yuan, while delivering 5 orders earns 25 yuan. It is clear which option the rider would choose; the latter can reduce the average cost per order by 1 yuan. This saved 1 yuan is likely to be shared among the platform, merchants, riders, and consumers, meaning that the leading platforms create a community that best aligns the interests of all parties.

As we have explained earlier, riders and merchants are rational actors in the transaction, with self-interested attributes, naturally investing more resources and time into platforms with higher order volumes and more stable profits. Consumers are no different; when leading platforms gather the richest merchant resources and the most abundant rider networks, the market will achieve optimal prices, quality, and service through sufficient competition, thus winning the favor of the most consumers.

Based on this, we can easily make a counter-consensus prediction about the competitive outcome.

IV. Counter-Consensus Outcome

Amid the clamor of subsidies, the market consensus seems to have turned into a “tripartite confrontation,” with voices claiming that the food delivery industry’s competitive moat is not that significant.

After the noise, I want to remind everyone to respect common sense.

The tide of subsidies rises and falls, but the competition for user experience never ends. Subsidies can create new increments, but when the tide recedes, most of these increments will convert into new stock for the leading platforms.

Every consumption is a vote cast by people with their own money. In the short term, people will vote for those who use money as bait, but in the long term, they will only reward those platforms that tirelessly enhance supply chain richness, fulfillment stability, and service accessibility.

Regarding this war, our other counter-consensus prediction is:

The food delivery battle appears to be JD.com and Taobao challenging Meituan's position in instant retail, but fundamentally, it is instant retail challenging the ecological niche of self-operated e-commerce.

As more resources flow into this field, consumers' mindset of 30-minute delivery for everything is becoming increasingly stronger. The overall richness of supply in the industry and the fulfillment network are being enhanced. While there may be a narrative of instant retail users feeding back into e-commerce, it may not be a major trend; rather, the shift of more users towards instant retail could be the prevailing trend.

We only need to look at three simple logics: the consumption habits of Generation Z are shifting, AI is driving social productivity and disposable income increases, and the structure of human society is becoming increasingly atomized and fast-paced.

The core advantage of self-operated e-commerce is speed, and instant retail is inherently faster.

Self-operated e-commerce is a typical centralized warehouse network, while instant retail is a distributed point platform. The distributed point structure is inherently superior to centralized warehouses; platform-based operations absorb a wide range of social idle resources and have cost advantages.

Due to being closer to consumers and having a naturally faster inventory turnover rate, brands will ultimately invest more and better resources into instant retail as a new incremental channel.

In the end, we will see instant retail comprehensively surpass self-operated e-commerce across the four dimensions of "more, faster, better, and cheaper."

Intergenerational migration is an objective law of the retail industry. We originally expected that the GMV of non-food instant retail would surpass self-operated e-commerce within five years. Now it seems that the takeaway war will accelerate this process, and it may be achieved within three years. We look forward to seeing this.

Author of this article: Zuo Ma de Han Zi, Source: Zuo Ma Finance, Original Title: "The Takeaway War Revelation: Expectation Gap and Counter Consensus"

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