Why did JD.com and Meituan "fight"?
Meituan's core local business CEO Wang Puzhong made strong remarks on social media regarding JD.com's delivery service, stating that its warehousing and distribution system should be swept into the dustbin of history. JD.com's GMV for 2024 is expected to reach 3.6 trillion, primarily from its self-operated business. Meituan's daily order volume for non-food categories has reached 18 million, demonstrating its strong growth in the instant retail sector. The order volume data mentioned by Wang Puzhong indicates that Meituan is gradually gaining an advantage in market competition
This morning, Meituan's CEO of Core Local Business, Wang Puzhong, discussed JD.com’s delivery services on social media, with a lot of tension.
The most provocative statement was: “Sweep those large and ineffective warehousing and distribution systems into the dustbin of history.”
What is being referred to here is, of course, JD.com's self-operated business.
In 2024, JD.com's overall GMV is approximately 3.6 trillion—this is not an exact figure, as JD.com has not disclosed its GMV for three years, but it should be very close to the actual situation.
As a side note, in February this year, Douyin's e-commerce head, Kang Zeyu, revealed in an internal meeting that Douyin's GMV for 2024 is 3.43 trillion, and unilaterally announced that it ranks third in the industry, second only to Taobao and Pinduoduo.
If this is true—major platforms usually have mutual monitoring data—it means JD.com's GMV is less than 3.43 trillion.
However, I personally think that JD.com's GMV being around 3.6 trillion is more likely; their disclosed figure in 2021 was 3.29 trillion, and the changes in company revenue can also roughly indicate the current scale.
Everyone knows that Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Shenzhen are recognized as first-tier cities, but who is the fifth city in China? It is said that at least five cities consider themselves to be the fifth in the country.
Anyway, there’s no need to be too serious about who is the third in the e-commerce industry.
Out of the 3.6 trillion GMV, JD.com's self-operated business accounts for about 1.6 trillion—this can be roughly inferred from self-operated revenue. According to the industry data we understand, JD.com's self-operated average order value is about 400 yuan, while non-self-operated is about 120 yuan—Taobao's is about 100 yuan. JD.com users tend to be more concentrated in higher-tier cities, and with a relatively higher proportion of 3C digital products, the average order value is higher than its peers. Therefore, we can calculate that JD.com's self-operated daily order volume is approximately 10.96 million orders, while non-self-operated daily order volume is about 45.66 million orders, totaling around 56.62 million orders.
Wang Puzhong disclosed a data point in his post: Meituan's non-food categories—meaning instant retail outside of delivery—have reached a daily order volume of 18 million. I am not sure if this data includes around 2 million from the Xiaoxiang supermarket; if not included, it would reach 20 million, which is a terrifying figure, equivalent to 1.6-1.8 times the order volume of JD.com's self-operated business.
Of course, what Wang Puzhong mentioned should be the peak order volume. In Q4 2024, Meituan's flash purchase daily order volume is approximately 10.45 million orders.
 is still growing at nearly 40%, while what is the growth rate of JD.com's self-operated business?
Almost 0.
Therefore, it is understandable that JD.com is making a big push into food delivery and instant retail.
From the perspective of the broader concept of instant retail (30-minute delivery of everything), as Wang Puzhong mentioned, JD.com actually started experimenting with this in 2014.
Meituan Flash Purchase began in 2018, and Xiaoxiang Supermarket (formerly Meituan Grocery) started in 2019.
A couple of weeks ago, I wrote an analysis article on the instant retail industry, which detailed:
Before 2019, JD Daojia + Dada were originally the kings of the instant retail industry. At that time, Meituan and Ele.me were fiercely competing in food delivery, with no time to spare, while Alibaba focused on Hema's new retail, and Pupu, Dingdong, and Daily Fresh were still small in scale.
Five years have passed, times have changed, Dada has delisted from the US stock market, and Meituan has become the new king of the instant retail industry.
With a new king rising, the old king is unwilling to give up, and the entanglement of love and hate is always more intense.
Wang Puzhong's response should be the first time a Meituan executive has directly addressed JD.com.
Prior to this, JD.com had actually launched multiple public relations offensives, including but not limited to:
Yesterday, JD.com CEO Xu Ran disclosed in an interview with Late Point that JD.com's food delivery is about to reach 5 million daily orders, which is also a peak.
On April 10, JD.com announced a launch of a 10 billion subsidy for food delivery.
On March 24, it announced that daily orders for JD.com food delivery had surpassed 1 million.
On February 19, it publicly announced that it would pay five social insurances and one housing fund for contracted full-time delivery riders, and on the 24th further announced that it would bear the personal cost of social insurance for contracted full-time delivery riders.
JD.com's food delivery is booming, but the public still feels that JD.com is just dabbling in food delivery. Nio CEO Li Bin also played the role of a bystander, asking Liu Qiangdong at JD.com's headquarters, "Is JD.com serious about food delivery?"
The answer received was, "Of course."
Interestingly, when JD.com held small meetings with institutional investors, the exact words they said were:
"The 10 billion subsidy is PR, it definitely does not mean an additional marketing budget of 10 billion. Historically, doing a 10 billion subsidy has not worsened profits."
"We didn't intend to win in food delivery, but it makes sense for JD.com's overall business."
How should we understand this polarized statement? It’s actually quite simple.
JD.com’s foray into food delivery is more of an intrusion, aimed at making Meituan uncomfortable, with the real target being instant retail, as retail is JD.com's main business.
Compared to JD.com's food delivery intruding on Meituan's food delivery, Meituan's instant retail impact on JD.com's self-operated business is even more fatal and urgent.
The scale of orders for both sides has already reversed—not just in the instant retail sector, but Meituan's instant retail order volume has reversed the entire JD.com self-operated business Although there is still a significant gap in GMV between the two parties, for a consumer platform, the key metric to measure its value is the order volume, not GMV.
Due to the huge difference in growth rates, the gap in order volume will continue to widen in the future.
If we take a look at the prices of products on the platforms, we might be even more surprised.
The above image shows the price of a 6-pack of Coca-Cola 330ml sold by Xiaoxiang Supermarket, which is 8.9 yuan.
What is the price of the same product on JD.com?
You are not mistaken, it is 17.5 yuan, the same brand, the same 6 cans, the same 330ml per can, the only difference is that the packaging on JD.com is slightly taller; they do not sell the shorter packaging like Xiaoxiang.
However, even with the taller packaging, Xiaoxiang sells it for only 12.9 yuan per set (6 cans), which is 4.6 yuan cheaper than JD.com, nearly a 30% price difference.
How can they compete? The exact same product is faster and cheaper than yours.
This is not an isolated case; last year, Meituan's flash purchase orders for alcoholic beverages were nearly twice that of JD.com's entire site, adult products were nearly four times that of JD.com's entire site, and even 3C digital orders were close to half of JD.com's entire site. In the fresh produce category, Xiaoxiang Supermarket also far exceeded JD.com's fresh produce.
From a logical analysis, this phenomenon is actually normal.
JD.com's self-operated model has established a nationwide next-day delivery system (some orders can be delivered on the same day), but this system is indeed quite expensive, and due to the large size of the warehouses, its delivery efficiency has evolved to about 6 hours, which is already the limit.
When it comes to high-value categories like 3C and digital products, this disadvantage in logistics and distribution costs can be minimized or even ignored Meituan's warehousing and distribution system is inherently urbanized. Whether it's local merchants on the flash purchase platform or the lightning warehouses and Xiaoxiang front warehouses, they are all based on a 30-minute coverage of users' geographical locations, making them naturally smaller, faster, and more flexible.
This makes them more suitable for cost-effective urban retail categories such as fresh produce, beverages, family planning products, and fast-moving consumer goods. These categories have a lower average transaction value, and the cost disadvantage of JD.com's self-operated distribution system will be magnified infinitely.
We know that the cost of goods includes not only the factory cost but also the warehousing and supply chain costs. Compared to JD.com's self-operated model, instant retail has not only a comprehensive cost advantage in core categories like fresh produce, beverages, family planning products, and fast-moving consumer goods but also a significant time efficiency advantage.
In addition, these categories have a characteristic of high consumption frequency. Given time, it would not be surprising for Meituan's instant retail daily order volume to reach 3-5 times that of JD.com's self-operated model. By then, user habits will shift, and everyone will gradually get used to purchasing 3C digital products through instant retail channels, putting JD.com's self-operated model in a more precarious position.
Everyone says that retail is about "more, faster, better, and cheaper."
Originally, speed was JD.com's core mindset, but this advantage is gradually crumbling.
Moreover, in terms of cost-effectiveness, JD.com's self-operated model does not hold much advantage in most categories.
I cannot say whether JD.com's self-operated warehousing and distribution system is "large but ineffective" or if it will be "swept into the dustbin of history," but it is an objective fact that they do not have much advantage outside of 3C digital products.
Another intriguing point is that JD.com could directly attack instant retail without wasting too much energy on food delivery. The so-called roundabout way to save the country may just be wishful thinking. They themselves have said, "We don't intend to win in food delivery." Why not use their strengths where they matter?
Perhaps it's because:
The more successful instant retail becomes, the more awkward JD.com's self-operated model will be.
This is somewhat reminiscent of Suning's transformation into e-commerce 20 years ago and Google's current focus on large models, caught in a dilemma.
To truly excel in instant retail, JD.com may need the determination to cut off its own arm and sink its boats, which is very difficult.
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